

# Needs Assessment



## Reducing Tier II Fitness Test Failures for ANG TACP



**BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY**

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
# Background & Process



**Conduct a systematic needs assessment for ANG TACP on the impact of the Tier-II Fitness Test on ANG TACP Mission Readiness.**



# Organization



**16 Units: 14 States, 2 Groups, 14 Squadrons, 1063 19ZXB/1Z3X1**

# Performance Gap




## CURRENT STATE



**ANG TACP  
Operators  
pass the Tier-  
II Fitness Test  
at a rate of  
70%**

GAP



## DESIRED STATE



**ANG TACP  
Operators pass the  
Tier-II Fitness Test  
at a rate greater  
than or equal to  
95%**


**25%  
Performance  
Gap**



# Problem & Impact




**Failure to pass the Tier-II fitness test directly affects an Airman's ability to train and maintain their combat mission readiness status. A 30% failure rate for ANG TACP results in 319 Airmen not being able to maintain their combat mission readiness for the Department of Defense.**




**USAF Total Force TACP**

ANG TACP makes up 47% of Total Force TACP




**ANG TACP Mission Capability Rate**

Of ANG TACP available, only 70% qualified to train and deploy based on Tier-II Fitness Test policy



**Worldwide Combat Capability Loss**

Mission capability rates result in worldwide combat capability loss.



**Army BCTs Covered**

Worldwide combat capability loss results in US Army BCTs coverage loss

**25% Performance Gap = 14% Loss in TACP Combat Capability USAF Wide**  
**10 of 58 US Army BCTs with no air-to-ground integration capability**



# Financial Considerations



## Initial Investment

\$450,000 per Airmen  
270 graduates annually  
USAF wide

## Training & Currency Maintenance

\$100,000 per Airmen  
Annually

## TACP Weapon System Costs

## Pay and Allowances

Vary by paygrade

## Human Performance Professional

\$75,000 - \$80,000 per unit  
Annually

30% failure rate is equivalent to \$143.5M initial investment loss  
<\$1K per Airmen = 1x HPO professional per unit



# Data Collection & Analysis





**UpStream Stakeholders**



**MidStream Stakeholders**




**Direct Impactees**



**Subject Matter Experts**

Extant Data	Interviews
Air Force Manual/Policy Review	In-Person and Phone Interviews
Literature Review	Semi-structured Zoom Interviews

# Methodology







# Performance Gap Analysis



	Goals	Design	Management
Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organization published implementation guidance and expectations for annual testing.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The design of the organization is appropriate for issuing guidance, strategy, policy and vision.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Guidance is published within AFMAN 10-3500 for performance review and program management.</li> </ul>
Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Annual requirement to pass is clearly published.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Some units have designed fitness programs</li> <li>- Use of these programs are entirely on the individual.</li> <li>- No standard or published process design for unit programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-No guidance how to report data and at what frequency</li> <li>- Very little data is collected/tracked</li> <li>- If data is collected, it is not used to modify future prep/training.</li> </ul>
Performer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Job specifications are clear</li> <li>- Performance Metrics are inadequate</li> <li>- There are no standard individual development Plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Roles/responsibilities, and skills are clear</li> <li>- Procedures for the annual requirement is clear.</li> <li>- Tools are inadequate</li> <li>- Training is inadequate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There is no published or practiced performance feedback mechanism.</li> <li>- Consequences for failure is published within AFMAN 10-3500.</li> <li>- ANG does not have any standard coaching program.</li> </ul>

# Cause Analysis



	Information	Resources	Incentives
Environment	<p>No informal evaluation, feedback, or preparation guidance</p>	<p>No personnel to guide prep.</p> <p>No consistent materials for traditional airmen when off base.</p>	<p>Financial &amp; nonfinancial incentives exist and are effective.</p> <p>Work environment is positive and competitive</p>
	Knowledge/Skills	Capacity	Motives
Individual	<p>No formal training for developing an individual exercise plan</p> <p>No structure for sharing individual knowledge</p>	<p>Airmen have the ability to learn.</p> <p>Traditional Airmen life conflicts make preparation more difficult</p> <p>“Older” TACP with multiple combat deployments appear to have more chronic injuries</p>	<p>Airmen want to do their job, train and perform well on fitness test.</p> <p>Highly motivated to remain mission ready.</p>

# Causes & Interventions



Cause Area	Root Causes	Intervention Types That
Environment-Information	Lack of clear guidance	<b>INFORM</b>
	Unclear goals/objectives	<b>DEFINE</b>
		<b>MEASURE</b>
	No tracking/reporting system	<b>STANDARDIZE</b>
Environment-Resources	Non-Standard Material Resources	<b>DEVELOP</b>
Environment-Resources	Lack of professional coaching resources	<b>DEVELOP</b>
Individual-Knowledge/Skills		

# Causes & Interventions



## Intervention Types That

## Potential Interventions

### INFORM

- Publish cyclical peer-reviewed/evidence-based articles to support fitness culture
- Publish evidence on the “why” behind tier-2 fitness testing linked job performance over time
- Publish cyclical job-aids on fitness guides for ANG TACP fitness options
- Publish ANG Specific Command Guidance on fitness culture and preparation

### DEFINE

- Consider redefining position and age standards for Tier-2 fitness test
- Consider redefining implications of failures

### MEASURE

- Clearly define and collect data to inform future decisions: injury, downtime, scores, etc.

### DEVELOP

- Invest in HPO staff to be available at each unit capable of remote fitness coaching

### STANDARDIZE

- Procure standard equipment for each HPO facility
- Standardize reporting systems and timelines (i.e. semi-annual practice tests)



# Prioritizing Interventions



Criteria	Weight	1	2	3
Cost of Implementation	3	>\$1M	>\$500k	Less Than \$500k
Ease of Implementation	1	Will require > 1-year to implement	6-12 Months	< 6-months
Potential to Reduce Injury Rate/Downtime	3	No potential to decrease	Marginal Potential to Decrease	High Potential to Decrease
Potential to Increase Pass Rate	3	No Potential to Increase	Marginal Potential to Increase	High Potential to Increase

Intervention Area	RAW SCORE	WEIGHTED SCORE
<b>INFORM</b>	10	24
<b>DEVELOP</b>	8	22
<b>DEFINE</b>	8	22
<b>MEASURE</b>	7	19
<b>STANDARDIZE</b>	7	15



# The Path Forward



## INFORM

Publish evidence-based articles using SW Human Performance Squadron




## INFORM

Publish job-aids on fitness programs for ANG TACP



## DEFINE

Consider changing implications for failure and age/ position policy changes for testing



## INFORM

Publish the “why” behind testing for TACP. Get the messaging correct

## DEVELOP

Invest in an HPO staff at each unit capable of providing remote fitness coaching for ANG TACP

**Low cost to high cost – invest in ANG TACP Airmen because humans are more important than hardware**



# Limitations & Opportunities



Theme	Limitation	Opportunity
Recency	New test requirement with limited data of actual effect on mission readiness	Get ahead of the readiness problem before it becomes a problem
	Ability to quantify institutional knowledge loss due to limited data pool	Expanded research for additional data points for future test policy decisions
Snapshot	Limited research pool and not time for surveys	Survey the force based on this report to understand concurrence
Long-Term Injury Prevention	Limited data on injuries within ANG TACP related to Tier-II testing	Develop data collection mechanism to assess impact of test with regards to injury



# Questions?





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# John Robertson



I am an Air Force TACP Officer pursuing a master's degree in Organization Performance and Workplace Learning at Boise State University.

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# Misha Thoma



I am a high school English teacher pursuing a masters degree in Organizational Performance and Workplace Learning from Boise State University.

I have spent the last eleven years teaching students at multiple grade levels and with a variety of needs.



# Osemome Ndebbio



I work as an Instructional Design Specialist and I'm currently working towards completing an MS in Organizational Performance and Workplace Learning at Boise State University.

My interests lie in creating learning environments that help learners reach their full potential in the workplace regardless of their socio-economic status or cultural background.

# Brittany Fifer



I am a Coast Guard Officer currently pursuing a master's degree in Organization Performance and Workplace Learning at Boise State University.

Prior to pursuing my post-graduate degree at Boise State, I served on three Coast Guard Cutters for six years in various positions, including two years as the Commanding Officer of a 154-foot Fast Response Cutter.